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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to the provision of UCA Section 63G-4-403 jurisdiction of this 
Petition for Review is in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. This is an 
appeal from the decision of the Lone Peak Public Safety District entered on 
February 18, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the ruling of the Board, after finding that Appellant made statements 
while under the influence of alcohol and legally prescribed prescription 
medication, a correct application of law justifying termination? 
Standard of review: "When reviewing a formal adjudicative proceeding 
the standard of review set out in Utah Code section 59-1-610 applies. The 
court must review the Commission's finding of fact under a i(substantial 
evidence" standard. See Utah Code Ann Section 59-1-610 (a) (1996). In 
other words, the court of appeals must uphold those findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, or "that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion. The court of appeals must review the Commission's 
conclusion of law for correctness giving no deference to the tribunals 
legal determination. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Year gin Inc. v. 
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm % 20 P. 3rd 287, 291 (UT 2001) 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Ut App. 1991) 
2. Whether the termination of Appellant was arbitrary and oppressive and in 
violation of his Due Process Rights pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United Stated Constitution and specifically violating 
appellant's fundamental liberty interest in Free Speech secured by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
Standard of Review: The court of appeals must review the Commission's 
conclusion of law for correctness giving no deference to the tribunal's 
legal determination. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Yeargin Inc. v. 
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm % 20 P 3rd 287, 291 (UT 2001) 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Ut App. 1991) 
Due process challenges are questions of general law and no deference to 
the agency's determination of what constitutes due process as reflected by 
the actual hearing, UtahDept of Admin. Servs.v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d. 602, 608 (UT 1983). See also Bunnell v. Industrial 
Comm% 740 P.2d 1331,1333 (Utah 1987). 
3. Whether Appellant was deprived of his constitutionally protected right to 
employment because the District exceeded its narrowly defined authority 
limiting punishment of employees only for acts committed in public, in 
direct violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Standard of Review: The court of appeals must review the Commission fs 
conclusion of law for correctness giving no deference to the tribunal's 
legal determination. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Yeargin Inc. v. 
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm % 20 P. 3rd 287,291 (UT 2001) 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23,27 (Ut App. 1991) 
4. Whether the Board of Appeals erred in finding that termination was a 
proportionate and proper sanction for his action? 
Standard of Review: In determining whether the sanction ofdismisal is 
warranted the Appellant must show either (1) that the facts do not support 
the action taken by the Department or (2) that the charges do not warrant 
the sanction imposed (Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm % 8 P.3rd 
1048). In reviewing whether the "charges warrant termination " the 
decision is evaluated to determine "if the Board has abused its discretion 
or exceeded its authority. Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm % 
111 P.3rd 474, 477,2007 UT App 336). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND 
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
1. Constitution of the United States-Bill of Rights Amendment I (Speech) 
2. Constitution of the State of Utah Article 1 Section 1 
3. Constitution of the United States Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process) 
4. Section 2 of the General Provisions of the Lone Peak Public Safety District 
Policy 
5. Utah Code Section 76-5-107 Terroristic Threats 
6. Utah Code Section 76-8-313 Threatening elected officials ~ Assault. 
7. Utah Code Section 76-8-314 elected officials defined 
8. Utah Code Section 17B-1-803 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
The challenged findings on this appeal concern whether the words spoken 
during a 2 a.m. surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation between Travis 
Turner and his former spouse can be deemed as misconduct justifying termination 
and whether the words spoken during the conversation can be considered as a legal 
threat or a violation of any law. 
7 
MARSHALED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDING OF 
THE LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT APPEALS BOARD 
On September 7,2008 at 2 o'clock a.m. during a surreptitiously recorded 
telephone conversation between Travis Turner and his former wife, Tara Turner, 
Travis Turner made the following statement, which is the nexus or core element 
forming the basis of Mr. Turner's termination: 
"I will kill people, Tara. And I'll start with that fat fuck Chad 
Smith. You think I am fucking kidding? You think I'm kidding? I will 
go postal. And I have plenty of guns and ammo to do it." (Transcript 
of telephone conversation entered into evidence as Exhibit 2 R p. 366 
pages 27-28) see also R p. 89 1. 14-21, R p. 95 115-12, testimony of 
Tara Turner, R p. 501. 7-12 testimony of Chief Bodkin. 
In addition to the telephonic recording, Tara Turner testified to the 
following alleged statements of Travis Turner which she also testified to in 
support of a protective order she sought after the September 7, 2008 
telephone call set forth in 1 above. 
"I think you should drop the charges with Stephanie." R p. 971.4-5; Lehi 
Police Dept "Narrative Statement of Fact" Exhibit 3 R p. 375. 
"I know that me asking you to do this is wrong and I could lose my job, 
but she is young and you are going to destroy her future with a criminal 
record." (R. p. 971. 10-12, Exhibit 3 R p. 376). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Lone Peak Public Safety District 
Board of Appeal conducted over a three evening period on January 22, February 5, 
and February 22, 2009 upholding the termination of Travis Turner, a Lone Peak 
police officer. 
Early in the morning on of February 7, 2009 prior to going to bed, Travis 
Turner consumed alcohol and took his regularly prescribed anxiety medication 
together with Loritab and Klonopin (R p.28 1. 21, R p. 2291. 1) Mr. Turner's 
experience on Klonopin was that it affected his judgment and memory and really 
"through him for a loop" (R p.2441.1-3). At approximately 2 a.m. Travis was 
awaken by a telephone call from his former spouse, Tara Turner (R p.228 1. 3-7; R 
p. 229 1. 5.) The telephone conversation was surreptitiously recorded by Tara 
Turner (R p. 85 1. 8-9; R. p. 242 1. 11-13; R p.418, Finding of Appeals Board 11). 
During the telephone conversation Travis Turner was under the influence of 
alcohol and prescription medications (R. p.419 Appeal Board Finding of Fact 14) 
Tara Turner took the recording to the Lehi Police Department and later, 
delivered a copy to Lt. Gwilliam of the Lone Peak Police Department (R p. 1401. 
3-6). 
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A temporary protective order was issued by the Fourth District Court on 
September 8, 2008, served on Travis Turner on September 9,2008 and dismissed 
on October 9,2008 following a hearing before the Court Commissioner (R. p.282 
1. 2-5).l As a result of the issuance of the protective order Travis Turner was placed 
on administrative leave and the Department commenced an internal investigation 
concerning Travis Turner. 
*\ 
Following the internal affairs investigation Chief Botkin conducted a pre-
disciplinary hearing. On November 21, 2008 Chief Botkin issued a termination 
recommendation (R. p.358). Chief Botkin's findings concluded that Travis Turner 
violated specific district policies that included; "Conduct which discredits the 
District," "Violations of criminal laws," "Conduct unbecoming an employee" and 
"Acts evidencing moral turpitude." 
On November 24,2008 the recommendation of Chief Botkin was "grieved" by 
email to Ted J. Stillman, Director Lone Peak Public Safety District and on 
November 26,2008 said Grievance was supplemented (Appendix p.l). Director 
Stillman affirmed the decision of Chief Botkin on December 4, 2008 (R p. 1) 
1
 At the time of the hearing before the Appeals Board the decision of the Commissioner 
dismissing the protective order was on appeal to the District Court. 
2
 Chief Botkin is incorrectly referred to throughout the record as Chief "Bodkin" for the purpose 
of this brief Chief Botkin's correct name will be utilized 
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On December 8, 2008 the decision of Director Stillman, to affirm the 
termination of Travis Turner, was appealed to the Lone Peak Public Safety District 
Board of Appeal (R. p. 380-383). 
Following three evening of hearings, the Lone Peak Public Safety District 
Board of Appeal, on a 3-1 vote, issued factual and legal conclusions upholding the 
termination of Travis Turner. The Board specifically concluded that: 
Mr. Turners conduct on September 7, 2008 constituted 
"misconduct" categorized as; "Conduct which discredits the 
department," "Conduct unbecoming and employee," and "acts 
evidencing moral turpitude." (R. p. 421 Ruling of the Appeal Board 
finding 3). 
Although the Appeals Board specifically found that, at the time of the recorded 
telephone call, "Mr. Turner was under the influence of alcohol and legally 
prescribed medications" (R. p. 419 Appeal Board Finding of Fact 14) the Board 
concluded that being under the influence of alcohol and legally prescribed 
medication; 
"does not mitigate against Mr. Turner being disciplined for this 
misconduct but does in fact argue in favor of the District needing to 
discipline Mr. Turner (R. p. 421 Appeal Board Conclusion 4). 
3
 The Board had ample evidence to support this finding based on the Testimony of Travis Turner 
regarding how Klonopin affected him (R. p. 238- L. 1-3) together with pharmaceutical data 
establishing side effects of Klonopin and Zolpidem (Ambien). 
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The Board further held that termination was justified because the September 
7,2008 conversation; 
".. .involved threats of violence, including the threat to use a 
gun and involved outside police agencies potentially putting 
the residents of Alpine City and Highland City at risk (R. p. 
421 Appeal Board Conclusion 5). 
Prior to Appellant's termination he had only one written reprimand during his 
employment with the District (R. p. 420; Appeal Board finding 23).4 Mr. Turner 
had no memory of participating in the September 7, 2008 conversation (R. p. 243 L 
20-23, R. p. 260,1. 11, R. p.267 1. 8-11,), although he acknowledged that it was his 
voice on the tape recording (R. p. 244 1. 14-17, Appeal Board Decision R.p.418 
Finding 12). 
4
 The only prior reprimand in Appellant's employment file was in the form of a letter of 
caution received by Travis Turner approximately seven years prior to this incident when he was 
cautioned by Lt. Gwilliam because he wore a short sleeve shirt on a designated long sleeve day 
(Rp.179 L 12-20; R. p. 184 L 441). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Lone Peak Public Safety District Board of Appeal, after finding that 
Appellant's statements were made while under the influence of alcohol and 
legally prescribed prescription medication, committed error by misapplying the 
law and upholding the termination of Appellant. 
POINT II 
The Lone Peak Public Safety District violated Appellants Fourteenth 
Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights when it upheld his termination 
based solely on the content of a surreptitiously recorded private conversation 
where there was no evidence of intent to communicate a threat and based further 
on Appellants lack of capacity to foresee that his non remembered statements 
could reasonably be interpreted as a threat, in violation of the exercise of 
Appellants fundamental liberty interest in free speech as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
POINT m 
The Lone Peak Public Safety District exceeded its authority to sanction 
Appellant by ignoring its own Rules and Regulations which limit the authority 
13 
of the district to punish employees only for acts committed in public, in 
violation of Appellants First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
POINT IV 
The Board of Appeals erred in finding that termination was a proportionate 
and proper sanction for his action 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Lone Peak Public Safety District Board of Appeal, committed error 
by misapplying the law and upholding the termination of Appellant. 
This court has previously ruled on a case that is striking similar to the 
underlying facts of this case dealing with statements made while under the 
influence of prescription medication, but with important factual and critical legal 
differences, Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm. 8 p.3d 1048, (UT App 
2000). 
In Kelly, a Salt Lake City police officer, intoxicated due to the effects of 
Ambien, repeatedly called the police and fire dispatch center. The calls were of 
a bizarre and inappropriate nature, included sexual innuendo, and false 
information regarding a reported fire. Dispatch learned the identity of the caller 
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and after checking on her welfare reported the incident to the police department 
Kelly, 1050. An Internal Affairs investigation was thereafter conducted and the 
Chief of Police decided to terminate officer Kelly not based on this one incident 
but rather Kelly's "history of sustained complaints," and "because of the gravity 
of her latest misconduct, coupled with her employment history" Id. 1051. This is 
where the facts of this appeal dramatically diverge from Kelly. 
The Board of Appeal in the present action specifically concluded that 
although there was some testimony that prior conduct of Officer Turner affected 
the Department that; 
"this personal conduct alone, being remote in time to the 
termination at issue in this hearing, and not the subject of any written 
discipline by the District when it first became known to the District, 
does not rise to the level of being "misconduct" or "cause" under the 
District's policies and cannot be basis for the termination of Mr. 
Turner (R. p. 420 Board of Appeals Decision Conclusion 2). 
During the hearing of Officer Turners appeal, no evidence of other 
complaints or similar action by Officer Turner was introduced. Officer Turner 
had recently been promoted to Sergeant (R. p. 417 Board of Appeals Decision 
finding 4); his employment file contained only one written reprimand that had 
been issued for wearing a short sleeve shirt on day designated for wearing long 
sleeve shirts" (R p. 179 1. 12-20; R. p. 1841. 4-11; R. p. 417 Board of Appeals 
15 
Decision Finding 23). Finally, unlike the Chief in Kelly at 1054, there was no 
evidence that Chief Botkin followed or had issued any form of progressive 
discipline (R. p. 420 Board of Appeals Decision Conclusion 2). 
The Appeal Board's decision to uphold the termination of Mr. Turner, 
unlike the decision of the court in Kelly, was based only on one incident; the 
surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation made at a time, as found by the 
Board, when Travis Turner was under the influence of alcohol and prescription 
medication. Based on this conversation alone the Board found that Travis 
Turner's conduct constituted; 
"conduct which discredits the District," "conduct unbecoming 
an employee," and "acts evidencing moral turpitude" (R. p. 421 Board 
of Appeals Decision Conclusion 3). 
The charge of "conduct unbecoming an officer." requires at least a 
demonstration that the officers conduct, was voluntary so that she can be shown 
to be responsible for the action themselves...." Kelly, 1053; citing Perry v. 
Philadelphia Civil Service Commission 529 A. 2d 616 (1987). 
The Perry court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Dillon, 518 A. 2d 
869 (1986) "held that such a charge requires at least a demonstration that the 
officer's conduct was voluntary so that he can be shown to be responsible for the 
16 
action themselves, without regard to any intention which he may or may not 
have had concerning their effect," Dillon 870. 
In Kelly, this court recognized that the issue of whether or not Officer 
Kelly's conduct was voluntary was legally significant when it stated that; 
"Had Kelly not been intoxicated when she made the non-emergency 
phone calls...., there is no doubt her actions would be conduct 
unbecoming an officer..." Id. 1053. 
The decision of the court in Kelly, was not focused on the involuntariness 
of Officer Kelly's intoxicated conduct but rather, and unlike the facts in Travis 
Turners case, was based on a finding by the Commission "that Officer Kelly 
ingested the medication in a manner inconsistent with medical advice was 
voluntary, thereby making her responsible for her conduct while intoxicated" 
Kelly, 1053. 
The Appeals Board in this case, made no finding that Travis Turners 
intoxication was voluntary or contrary to medical advice. No evidence was 
introduce that could support such a finding. 
The fact that the Board found Officer Turner to be intoxicated with 
alcohol and prescription medications, without any evidenced or challenge by 
the Department that his intoxication was voluntary or contrary to medical 
directives, demonstrates that the Board ignored the fact that Travis Turners 
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conduct was not voluntary and he should therefore not be responsible for his 
conduct when it upheld his termination for "conduct unbecoming an officer "or 
for any other reason, based solely upon the surreptitiously recorded telephone 
conversation of September 7,2008. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
The Lone Peak Public Safety District violated Appellants Fourteenth 
Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights when it upheld his termination 
based solely on the content of a surreptitiously recorded private conversation 
where there was no evidence of intent to communicate a threat and based further 
on Appellants lack of capacity to foresee that his non remembered statements 
could reasonably be interpreted as a threat, in violation of the exercise of 
Appellants fundamental liberty interest in free speech as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and his Substantive Due 
Process Rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
The First Amendment guarantees the right of Freedom of Expression and 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from "depriving any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. Const, amend. 14 Sec. 1. 
The Due Process Clause "guarantees more than fair process." Seegmiller 
v. Laverkin City, 528 F3rd 762, 766 (10th Cir. 2008) citing; Washington v. 
Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). The Due Process Clause "covers a 
substantive sphere as well, barring certain government actions regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them" Seegmiller 766, 767, citing 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1997). In its substantive 
mode, the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection against arbitrary and 
oppressive government action, even when taken to further a legitimate 
governmental objective, Id at 845-846. 
The Supreme Court has described two strands of the substantive doctrine. 
One strand protects an individual's fundamental liberty interest, while the other 
protects against the exercise of governmental power that shocks the conscience 
Seegmiller 767. 
A fundamental right or liberty interest is one that is "deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 
Seegmiller 767, citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003). The right 
of free speech is a fundamental right or liberty interest that is deeply rooted in 
our nation's history and tradition and is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe fundamental liberty 
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Seegmiller 161, citing 
Glucksberg 521 U.S. at 721. 
In this case, Travis Turner was terminated based solely on the content of a 
private verbal statement, made during a 2 A.M. telephone conversation while he 
was under the influence of alcohol and prescription medication (R. p. 419 
rinding 14). Travis Turner did not have a memory of participating in the 
conversation (R. p. 243 1. 20-23). The statement was found by the Appeal Board, 
in spite of its finding of Travis's intoxication, to be a threat directed at the Lehi 
Chief of Police justifying his termination. 
Admittedly the First Amendment does not protect against threats of 
violence Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). The Supreme Court in 
Watts set forth no particular definition or description of a true threat that 
distinguishes an unprotected threat from protected speech Doe v. Pulaski County 
Special School Dist, 306 F.3"1616 (8th Cir. 2002). 
Following Watts, the lower courts were left to ascertain for themselves 
when a statement triggers the government's interest in preventing the disruption 
and fear of violence associated with a threat, Pulaski, 622. The Pulaski court, in 
examining rulings of federal court of appeals that have announced a test to parse 
true threats from protected speech, found two camps of thought; 
"All the courts to have reached the issue have consistently 
adopted an objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable 
person would interpret the purported threat as a serious expression 
of an intent to cause a present or future harm. See Id. The views 
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among the courts diverge, however, in determining from whose 
viewpoint the statement should be interpreted. Some ask whether a 
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the speaker would 
foresee that the recipient would perceive the statement as a threat, 
whereas others ask how a reasonable person standing in the 
recipient's shoes would view the alleged threat." Pulaski 622 citing, 
"Compare Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. 
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc), with United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. ), 
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 968, 115 S. Ct 435, 130 L.Ed.2d 347 (1994). 
The Utah Court is in the "camp" identified in Pulaski that focuses its 
analysis of a true threat from the viewpoint of the person making the statement 
rather than from the viewpoint of the person who hears the communication. 
Last year this court announced the applicable standard to establish whether a 
person intended to make a threat when it held that "Intent is established when a 
person makes a threat that a reasonable person vtoul&foresee as being 
interpreted by those to whom the defendant communicates the statement as a 
serious expression of intent to harm or assault", State v. Johnson 178 P.3d 915, 
919 (UT. App. 2008), citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 
1265 (9th Cir.1990). 
Counsel for Respondent repeatedly, and contrary to the ruling of Johnson, 
misstated the law by arguing that intent to make a threat is established when the 
person who hears the threat takes it seriously, thus establishing a violation of the 
law (R. p. 388). The Appeal Board utilized a clearly erroneous legal standard by 
analyzing Mr. Turner's language from the viewpoint of the person who hears the 
statement rather than from the speaker's (Travis Turner) viewpoint as to whether 
he could reasonably foresee the statement would be interpreted as a serious 
threat. 
The finding by the Appeal Board that Travis was under the influence of 
liquor and prescription medication requires a conclusion that Travis Turner did 
not have the mental acumen or ability to foresee how his statements would be 
interpreted by his former spouse. Travis was so intoxicated that he did not even 
remember participating in the conversation (R. p. 243 1.20-23). In effect, the 
Appeal Boards ruling upheld the termination of Travis Turner because he was 
intoxicated (R. p. 421 Appeal Board Conclusion 4) and without regard to 
Travis's lack of capacity, to appreciate or foresee the possible effects of the 
statements made to his former spouse as required by Johnson Id. 919. 
Not only did Travis Turner not have the capacity to foresee the effect of 
his statements, he did not have had the intent to communicate any threat at all. 
To punish or discipline an individual for a true threat the speaker must have 
intentionally or knowingly communicated the statement in question to someone 
Pulaski, citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). Intent is a key 
element in the Utah Statutes that provide criminal sanctions for threats.5 
Before the Pulaski court commenced an analysis as to whether the letter 
written by J.M. was a true threat or protected speech it considered the threshold 
question of whether, J.M., intended to communicate the purported threat, Id, 
624. The Pulaski court's reasoning in considering J.M.'s intent to communicate 
a threat before actually analyzing the content of J.M's letter was that "requiring 
less than an intent to communicate the purported threat would run afoul of the 
notion that an individual's most protected right is to be free from governmental 
interference in the sanctity of his home and in the sanctity of his own personal 
thoughts;' Pulaski, 624 citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
The court in Pulaski ultimately found that J.M intended to communicate a 
threat because he allowed a friend, D.M., to read a threatening letter that J.M, 
had written. Thereafter D.M. without the knowledge or permission of J.M. 
obtained a copy of the letter and delivered it to the person who the letter 
5
 There is no Utah Statute that specifically sanctions mere threatening language. Utah Code 
Section 76-5-107 sanctions Terroristic threats if the use of a weapon of mass destruction or 
the hoax of a weapon of mass destruction is threatened and then the threat is made with 
specific intent.... (In this case there is no mention of a weapon of mass destruction). Utah 
Code Section 76-8-313 defines assault on an elected official when he threatens to inflict 
bodily injury on an elected official with the intent to impede (In this case the Lehi Chief 
of police is not an elected official 
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threatened.6 The scenario in Pulaski is very different than the case at bar. First, 
J.M. intended to write a threatening letter, he was not incapacitated or 
intoxicated at the time he wrote it; while Travis Turner had no intention of 
communicating a threat and was intoxicated at the time. Second, J.M. knew and 
appreciated that he was recording his thoughts in a written form; while Travis 
Turner, who not only did not remember participating in the conversation, did not 
know that his intoxicated statement was being recorded. Third, J.M. shared his 
intentionally written thoughts with another individual; while Travis Turner, 
again did not even remember participating in the conversation with his ex-wife. 
Finally, and another major difference between the findings in Pulaski and this 
case, the Pulaski court utilized the reasonable recipient standard, viewing the 
threat from the viewpoint of the recipient, Id. 624 while Utah Law requires a 
true threat analysis applying the viewpoint of the communicator as required by 
Johnson Id. 919. An analysis of Travis Turners statement utilizing the Johnson 
required analysis would require a very different conclusion because Travis 
Turner, because of incapacity, could not have foreseen or contemplated the 
effect of his non -remembered statement. 
6
 The Pulaski Court "is in the camp that views the nature of the alleged threat from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable recipient" Pulaski 622 
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The Appeal Board clearly committed legal error resulting in the denial of 
Mr. Turner's constitutional rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments to the 
United States Constitution by upholding the decision of the Department to 
terminate Mr. Turner 
POINT III 
The Lone Peak Public Safety District deprived Appellant of his property 
interest in employment when it exceeded its authority by imposing a sanction for 
a non-public statement in violation of Appellants First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights pursuant to the Constitution of the United States. 
In this case Mr. Turner has been deprived of a property right to continued 
employment which has consistently been determined to be a constitutional 
protected right requiring protection of the Due Process Clause. An employee 
posses a property interest in public employment if they have tenure, a contract for a 
fixed term, an implied promise of continued employment, or if state law allows 
dismissal only for cause or its equivalent. Darr v. Town ofTelluride Colo 495 F.3d 
(10th Cir. 2007) See Id. at 576-77,92 S. Ct. 2701; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 
344 (1976); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136,1140-41 (10th Cir.1999). The Rules 
and Regulations of the Department (R. Appendix 4 sub 1), together with Section 
17B-1-803 UCA, establish that state law allows dismissal only for cause or its 
equivalent. See also Potts v. Davis County 010609 FED10, 07-4139 United States 
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit Jan 6, 2009. 
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The Rules and Regulations of the Lone Peak Public Safety District provide 
notice to its employees of their required conduct "in dealing with the general 
public" as follows: Section 2 GENERAL; 
The conduct of Public Safety District employees in dealing with 
the general public is expected and required to be commensurate with 
the high level of public trust placed upon the Public Safety profession. 
Any public action, inaction, attitude or opinion of personnel which 
can be interpreted as unprofessional or unworthy of the public trust in 
Public Safety Officials tends to undermine and detract from the public 
respect of Public Safety Members individually and collectively. 
(Appendix 4 sub-section 2 p.52) 
The foregoing District policy, in light of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, dangerously extends to 
include ""attitudes or opinions" held by the employee. The policy is tempered 
and conditioned by the requirement that the attitude or opinion must be made or 
demonstrated in "public." 
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe 
fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless 
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 
Seegmiller Id. 767, citing Glucksberg 521 U.S. at 721. 
The District policy regarding the conduct of its employees appears to be 
an attempt to narrowly tailor the situations where employees may be sanctioned 
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for action, inaction or opinions demonstrated or expressed in public. Assuming, 
for argument purposes only, that the District has some compelling governmental 
interest to sanctioning employees for public action or expression of opinions 
which may embarrass the district in a public setting, there is no question but that 
the district does not have the right to abridge its employee's fundamental liberty 
rights to free speech or their private opinion or belief not expressed in public. 
The termination of Travis Turner deprived him of his constitutionally 
protected property interest in continued employment. The termination is a 
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Additionally, the 
termination by the District was contrary and beyond the scope of its announced 
and presumably narrowly tailored policy to reserve the right to sanction 
employee conduct if committed or opinions were expressed in public. 
POINT IV 
The Board of Appeals erred in finding that termination was a 
proportionate and proper sanction. 
A determination of whether the sanction of dismissal is not proportionate 
requires appellant to show either (1) that the facts do not support the action 
taken by the District or (2) that the charges do not warrant the sanction imposed 
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 8 P.3rd 1048 (Ut. App 2000). 
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In this case, the findings of the Board of Appeal and argument herein, 
clearly establish that Travis Turner made unremembered statements while under 
the influence of alcohol and prescription medications. The circumstances 
existing at the time of the statement, as found by the Appeals Board, 
demonstrate Travis Turner's lack of intent to communicate at all and equally as 
important that could not have intended to make a threat. The fact that Travis 
Turner made a statement, while under the influence of alcohol and prescription 
medication does not support the Appeal Boards decision to affirm the 
termination solely because of the content of the statement. 
Based on Travis Turner's lack of intent to communicate at all, or to make 
a threat, the facts relied upon by the board do not support its decision to affirm 
the termination. Additionally, the Board of Appeals by upholding the 
termination abused its discretion and exceeded its authority, by violating Travis 
Turner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by exceeding the narrowly 
tailored scope of the Districts policy to sanction employees for acts and or 
opinions stated in public (Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm 'n, 171 
P.3"1 1048 (UT.APP 2007). 
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Board of Appeals must be 
held as an abuse of discretion because the facts do not support its conclusion and 
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further that the District exceeded its authority to sanction employees for non-
public acts or statements. 
:th DATED this 25m day of June 2009 
Id D. Conder 
orney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIL 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief to the following party on the 2^> day of June 2009: 
David L. Church 
5995 South Redwood Road 




Amendment 1 - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression. Ratified 12/15/1791. 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 





Section (1) All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
law. 
Section (2) Representatives shall be appropriate among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for the President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State or the members of the Legislatures thereof is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridge, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime the basis representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State . 
Section (3) No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
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enemies thereof. But Congress may by vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section (4) The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized 
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But 
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or 
obligation in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section (5) The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 




CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 




LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
TITLE: EMPLOYEE TERMINATION 
Effective Date: 07-01-99 Revised: 
Approved by: PSD Board Dist. To: All Personnel 
Section 1: POLICY 
It is the policy of this District to deal with employees fairly and equitably. Should 
disciplinary action become necessary to the point of terminating employment, the 
District will deal with each employee according to this policy. 
Section 2: TYPES OF REMOVAL 
A. Resignation. A full-time employee who resigns shall submit his resignation 
in writing to his Department Chief and give at least two (2) weeks notice. 
1. The Public Safety Director, on the recommendation of the 
Department Chief, may shorten or waive the notice period. 
B. Temporary employment. Temporary employees may be terminated at such 
time as their assigned job is completed or funding for the project is 
exhausted. 
C. Probationary employee termination. A probationary employee may be 
terminated without cause. 
D. Unsatisfactory Service. An employee who has completed the probationary 
period may be terminated or subject to disciplinary action if his/her 
performance or conduct is not satisfactory; if he/she proves unsuited to 
his/her work; or if for medical reasons he/she is no longer qualified for the 
positioa 
Section 3: Disciplinary Procedure. 
A. Prior to termination, excluding termination pursuant to Sections 2,4 and 5 
of this policy, an employee shall be given a verbal or written warning and a 
reasonable time to rectify the problem. 
B. An employee whose conduct or performance is considered unsatisfactory 
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shall be subject to the following: 
1. Counseling 
2. Reprimand 
3. Decision-Making Leave 
4. Discipline 
C Types of Discipline: Employees who do not correct unsatisfectory conduct 
or performance, or who commit oflFenses of such a serious nature that 
require immediate expulsion from work, are subject to the following: 
1. Suspension 
An employee may be suspended with or without pay as a 
disciplinary measure. Suspension without pay requires a pre-
disciplinary hearing and must have the approval of the Public Safety 
Director. 
An employee may be suspended without pay for an indefinite period 
of time as a result of a criminal complaint in a court of law, in 
which case the suspension may continue until the matter is 
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. If the charges are 
not sustained, the District may still administer further discipline if 
the District can substantiate misconduct. 
2. Demotion 
An employee may be demoted as a result of disciplinary action. 
Prior to any demotion, an employee shall receive a pre-disciplinary 
hearing. Said hearing will be conducted by the appropriate 
Department Chief or Public Safety Director and will offer the 
employee the opportunity to present any information they so desire, 
in their behalf 
3. Probation 
As a form of discipline an employee may be placed on probation for 
a period not to exceed six (6) months in an effort to further 
evaluate and rehabilitate the employee. 
4. Termination 
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An employee may be terminated as a result of disciplinary action. 
Prior to termination, the employee shall receive a pre-termination 
hearing. Said hearing will be conducted by the appropriate 
Department Chief 
D- Notification: An employee shall be notified in writing of any disciplinary 
action that could lead to suspension, demotion, or termination, and shall be 
afforded the opportunity to meet with the Public Safety Director (or his/her 
representative) to discuss the proposed disciplinary action prior to the 
action being taken- An employee may also respond to the proposed 
disciplinary action in writing, 
E- Records of disciplinary action, excluding oral warnings, will be retained in 
the employee's official personnel file for a two (2) year period, unless other 
disciplinary action occurs. If two (2) years have passed without any further 
discipline and the document is not the subject of a pending investigation, 
the disciplinary record will be removed from the personnel file upon written 
request of the employee to the Public Safety Director. Formal periodic 
evaluations are exempt from any removal process. 
The employee shall have access to his/her personnel file, along with the 
employee's representative, while the employee is present. An employee 
may insert into the personnel file a rebuttal statement which is directly in 
response to written reprimands or negative commentary in the file. Upon 
the request of any employee they shall be given a copy of any material 
contained in their personnel file. 
No item or information will be placed in an employee's personnel file 
without the employee's knowledge. It is not necessary that the employee 
agree with or approve the placement of any item or material in the 
personnel file. This is simply to ensure that the enqrioyee has knowledge of 
items or material(s) being placed in a personnel file. The employee's 
signature or initials on the item or material is sufficient to substantiate 
knowledge. Failure by an employee to sign or initial an item or material 
will not prevent that item/material from being placed in the personnel file. 
A supervisor will make a notation including the date on the item or material 
that the employee refused to sign or initial the item or material. The item 
will then be placed in the employee's personnel file. 
F. Any written record of discipline not previously provided to the employee 
will not be used as basis for subsequent progressive discipline. 
23 
TITLE: EMPLOYEE TERMINATION 
Section 4: "MSCONDUCT OR "CAUSE." 
An employee may be disciplined, up to and including termination without prior 
warning for the following misconduct or cause. "Misconduct'' or "Cause" 
includes, but not limited to: 
A. Violation of the criminal laws of the United States, the Sate of Utah or any 
other state, the violation of which, had it occuiTed in Utah would be a 
crime in Utah. 
B. Violation of any provision of the Charter of any member cities of the 
District 
C. Violation of District Rules. 
D. Outside employment which conflicts or interferes with assigned duties. 
E. Solicitation as District employees of the public for money, goods, or 
services not specifically authorized by the Public Safety Director. 
F. Acceptance or solicitation of a bribe or any compensation intended to 
influence the employee in the performance of his/her duties for the District. 
G. Divulgence of any confidential material to anyone not authorized to receive 
it. 
H. Conduct which discredits the District. 
L Improper use of one's employment with the District for the employee's 




M. Neglect of duties. 
N. Unexplained absence from duty. 
O. Malfeasance, misfeasance or misconduct in office. 
P. Conduct unbecoming an employee. 
Q. Acts evidencing moral turpitude. 
R. Sexual or racial harassment action. 
S. Willful violation of safety practices in performance of duties, including 
operation of District equipment and vehicles. 
T. Alcohol or substance abuse on the job. 
U. Unauthorized use of District property, equipment and/or materials. 
Section 5: ABANDONMENT OF POST 
An employee absent from duty in excess of three (3) days without a 
satisfactory explanation shall be considered to have abandoned his post and 
shall be terminated provided that the employee's Department Chief shall 
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make a reasonable effort to locate the employee. 
B. Reasonable effort to locate an employee shall be satisfied if the Department 
Chief sends a 44mailgram" to the employee at the address shown in the 
employee's personnel file. 
C. Termination pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be for just cause. 
Section 6: ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS AND PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION IN 
FORCE. 
A The District may eliminate any position. 
B. When a position is eliminated and/or a reduction in force takes place, the 
following procedure will apply: 
An employee to be terminated because of the elimination of his/her job or a 
reduction in force shall be permitted to exercise his/her seniority to move 
laterally or downward within the same Department to a position for which 
the employee has the immediate skill and ability. The sole determination of 
the employee's skill and ability shall be determined by the District. It is 
understood that any positions currently federally funded are not subject to 
this procedure should a reduction in force occur due to cessation of federal 
funding. 
Failure to immediately perform all duties of the position subjects the 
employee to immediate dismissal, with no right of recall 
Should an employee elect not to use his right to move he shall have first 
right of recall in accordance with his/her re-employment in relation to 
filling the original position that was eliminated. 
C. Termination under this section shall require at least two weeks notice to 
the employee or payment in lieu of notice. 
Section 7: NOTICE 
A. Written notification. Any termination under this Article shall be in writing 
and shall set forth the reasons for such termination. 
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B. No appeal Terminations pursuant to Sections 2 (A), (B) and 6 (A) above 
shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration provisions. 
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
TITLE: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
Effective Date: 07-01-99 Revised: 
Approved by: PSD Board Dist To: All Personnel 
Section 1: POLICY 
It is the policy of this District to provide a grievance procedure for those 
employee's who feel they have been dealt with in a contrary, unfair or unjust 
manner. 
Section 2: PROCEDURE 
A. The purpose of the Grievance Procedure shall be to settle all grievances 
between the District and the enq>loyee as quickly as possible to insure 
efficiency and promote employee morale. Should any employee, group of 
employees, or the District feel aggrieved, including the claim of unjust 
discrimination or any matter or condition affecting health and safety beyond 
those normally encountered in all phases of normal work requirements, 
adjustment shall be sought as follows: 
L In order to promote harmony, the employee is encouraged to 
discuss matter in dispute with the immediate supervisor first. 
2. All grievances must be filed in writing, within five (5) working days 
after the matter in dispute or disagreement is alleged to have 
occurred; 
Step 1: The grievance shall first be discussed between the employee and the 
immediate supervisor within five (5) working days of its filing. If the 
grievance is not settled during this informal discussion, it may be processed 
to Step 2. 
Step 2: Within three (3) working days from the date of informal discussion 
with the immediate supervisors), but not later than eight (8) working days 
after the act or omission giving rise to the grievance, the immediate 
supervisor shall present the grievance, in writing, to the Department Chief 
or his representative. The Department Chief or his representative shall 
arrange for such meetings with the Employee and make such investigations 
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as are necessary. The Department Chief shall respond in writing to the 
aggrieved within five (5) working days of his receipt of said grievance. If 
the response does not resolve the grievance, it may proceed to Step 3. 
Step 3: Within three (3) working days from receipt of the written response 
from the Department Chie£ the employee shall present the grievance, in 
writing, to the Public Safety Director, accompanied by all correspondence 
and existing evidence on the matter. The Public Safety Director after 
consultation with the aggrieved employee, will make a determination within 
five (5) working days from the date of submission to himu 
Step 4: If a mutually satisfectory settlement cannot be reached between the 
Public Safety Director and the Employee, the Employee shall file notice 
within five (5) working days with the Public Safety District Board for final 
determination. 
1. When such notice is filed with the Public Safety District Board, the 
Board shall hear the matter within a thirty (30) day period. 
2. If such notice is not filed within five (5) working days with the 
Public Safety District Board the grievance shall be deemed 
withdrawn with prejudice. 
C. Upon a final determination on the matter, having been made by the Public 
Safety District Board, each party retains any legal right for further action 
they deem necessary. 
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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
TITLE: INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
Effective date: 07-01-99 Revised: 
Approved By: PSD Board Dist. To: All Personnel 
Section 1: POLICY 
It is the policy of this District to investigate all complaints of possible employee 
misconduct to determine whether allegations are valid or invalid and to take 
appropriate action. 
Section 2: DEFINITIONS 
A. COMPLAINT 
An inquiry, request or demand that the District investigate possible 
employee misconduct. A complaint may be initiated by ANY person, 
including District employees. Known as a "Citizen's Complaint" when 
initiated by a person outside the District. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION 
An administrative process whereby the District investigates complaints. 
Section 3: GUIDELINES 
A. RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
Information related to an administrative investigation may only be released 
to the media or outside interests at the direction of the Public Safety 
District Board or their designee. 
B. COMPLAINTS WITH SIMILAR CONTEXT 
When three (3) or more complaints of a similar context arise against any 
one employee within any twelve (12) month period, all subsequent 
complaints of that nature may be classified as FORMAL at the direction of 
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the Department Chief. 
C POLYGRAPH/TRUTH VERIFICATION 
1. Employees will not be ordered or directed to submit to a polygraph 
or truth verification examination on any matter under investigation 
by this District. Nothing in this policy is intended to deny the 
District from requesting an employee to submit to a polygraph or 
truth verification examination. No disciplinary action may be taken 
against any employee for refusing to submit to a polygraph/truth 
verification examination. 
2. Nothing in this policy is intended to deny an employee the privilege 
of requesting a polygraph/truth verification examination when they 
feel that it is their best interest. 
3. Should a polygraph or truth verification examination be taken/given 
the party requesting the examination shall pay the cost of said 
examination. 
Section 4: CRIMINAL VS. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
A. PRECEDENCE 
A criminal investigation shall take precedence over an administrative 
investigation. When an employee becomes the focus of a criminal 
investigation, no administrative investigation shall be initiated until: 
1. Such time notification is received by the Director of Public Safety 
investigation has either been concluded or initiation of an 
administrative investigation would not otherwise compromise the 
criminal investigation. 
2. At that time, the Director of Public Safety shall make a 
determination as to whether an administrative investigation is 
conducted. 
3. In cases of criminal investigations, notification to the involved 
employee(s) shall not be made until such time that it is determined 
by the Chief of Police that notification would not interfere with the 
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criminal investigation-
B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATION 
1. All criminal investigations will be performed by the Police 
Department unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Police. 
2. Administrative investigations will be performed by a supervisor. 
Section 5: PROCEDURES 
A INITIATING COMPLAINTS 
2. A complaint may be initiated by any person. A complaint may be 
communicated by mail, telephone, electronic message or in person. The 
complainant may identify him/herself or remain anonymous. Any person 
may be informed that a complaint may be made to any of the 
following: 
a Appropriate Department Chief 
b. Director of Public Safety. 
c. Any PSD Board member. 
& Utah County Attorney's Office. 
e. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). 
2. Non-supervisory personnel initiated a personal complaint or receiving a 
citizen complaint should direct the complaint/complainant to their 
immediate supervisor or to a Department Chief. 
3. Supervisory personnel initiating a personal complaint receiving a citizen 
complaint or having a complaint/complainant forwarded to them by non-
supervisory personnel will review the allegations and classify the complaint. 
If the complaining citizen is insistent upon filing the complaint with the 
supervisor at the time of contact, the supervisor will fill out the 
CITIZEN'S COMPLAINT FORM, give the citizen witness statement 
forms to fill out and forward the complaint to their Department Chief. 
B. CLASSIFYING COMPLAINTS 
1. A complaint may be classified as INFORMAL when the complaint alleges 
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minimal misconduct, the alleged violation does not meet the criteria for this 
manual's definition of MISCONDUCT, and the complainant does not wish 
to file a written complaint. A complaint that meets the definition of 
MISCONDUCT will be classified as FORMAL and referred as outlined, 
even if the complainant does not wish to file a written complaint. 
2. A complaint will be classified as FORMAL, when: 
a. the complaint may result in an employee facing discipline beyond 
verbal admonishment and/or training. 
b. the complaint alleges any unnecessary or excessive use offeree. 
c. the complaint may require having the employee: 
(1) participate in a lineup of any form. 
(2) submit to a medical/laboratory examination. 
(3) submit financial disclosure. 
C. FORWARDING COMPLAINTS 
Once a complaint has been classified, the supervisor has three (3) options 
in forwarding the complaint for preparation of investigation: 
1. If the supervisor is within the involved employee's chain of 
command he/she may retain and prepare the complaint for 
investigation. 
2. If the supervisor is not within the involved employee's chain of 
command the supervisor will forward the complaint to the 
appropriate chain of command, with every effort made to forward 
the complaint to a rank similar to their own. 
3. Forwarded to the accused Department Chief if the complaint is of 
serious nature or may require extensive investigation (even though 
not a citizen complaint). 
D. PREPARING COMPLAINTS 
1, The preparation of INFORMAL complaints for investigation does 
not require the use of any District form or report. It is the 
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supervisor's responsibility to ensure that the complaint will be 
professionally addressed. 
2. The preparation of FORMAL complaints for investigation requires 
the use of District forms. The forms required are: 
a- a CITIZEN'S COMPLAINT FORM (only when initiated by 
a citizen, not when initiated internally). 
a. a NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. 
b. Witness Statements, from complainant or persons providing 
information. 
3. Whenever a NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION 
is prepared a copy shall be immediately forwarded, through the 
chain of command, to the OflSce of the Director of Public Safety. A 
copy will also be given to the Public Safety District Board to inform 
them of the investigatioa 
E. INVESTIGATING INFORMAL COMPLAINTS 
Supervisors investigating complaints classified as INFORMAL, shall: 
L Notify the involved employee who is the focus of the complaint no 
later than ten (10) calendar days after receipt/initiation of the 
complaint by the District and allow the employee to respond to the 
complaint in writing. 
2. Conclude the investigation and forward a memo indicating 
resolution to the Department Chief 
3. Notify the involved employee of the resolution of the INFORMAL 
complaint The employee may again respond in writing and have 
such writing included in the completed investigative package, a 
complete copy of which shall then be provided to the involved 
employee. 
4. Refer to Section F of this policy if at any point during an 
INFORMAL investigation, a determination is made that a 
FORMAL investigation is required 
33 
TITLE: INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
5. Forward complete INFORMAL investigative package to the 
Department Chief. 
F. INVESTIGATING FORMAL COMPLAINTS 
Supervisors investigating complaints classified as FORMAL, shall: 
1. Notify the involved employee who is the focus of the complaint no 
later than ten (10) calendar days after receipt/initiation of the 
complaint by the District. Notification shall be made by having the 
employee sign and receive a copy of a NOTICE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. 
2. Obtain a written or tape recorded statement from the employee 
concerning the allegations outlined in the complaint. 
3. Notify the Department Chiefs through the chain of command, in 
writing every ten (10) calendar days as to the status of the on-going 
investigation. 
4. Conclude the investigation and forward a SUPERVISOR'S 
REPORT OF DISCREPANCY to the Department Chief through 
the chain of command. 
The Department Chief shall: 
5. Review the material assign a disposition and indicate what action is 
to be taken, if any. 
6. Notify the involved employee and the complainant, if known, of the 
resolution of the FORMAL complaint. 
7. The employee may again respond in writing and have such writing 
included in the investigative package, a complete copy of which will 
then be provided to the employee. 
8. Notification to the complainant shall include only the disposition of 
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G. DISPOSITIONS 
When an Administrative Investigation has been concluded, a disposition 
shall be assigned as follows; 
1. Exonerated: the alleged conduct occurred, but was lawftd or 
proper. 
2. Unfounded: the allegation is false or not factual. 
3. Not Sustained: insufficient evidence to either prove or disprove 
allegation. 
4. Sustained: sufficient evidence to prove the allegation. 
5- Misconduct Not Bases on Original Complaint: sustained acts of 
misconduct, not alleged in the complaint. 
6. Policy/Procedure Failure: Flaw in policy caused incident. 
H. DISCIPLINARY ACTION 

















Discipline received may be one or more of the above listed actions 
depending on the severity of the infraction/misconduct. 
L RETAINING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION PACKAGES 
All complaints and investigative packaged shall be retained by the Director 
of Public Safety. No other record of a complaint shall be made in any other 
file, except when disciplinary action is taken following a FORMAL 
complaint. A copy of the letter sent to the employee by the Department 
Chief indicating the disciplinary to be taken shall be forwarded to the 
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employee's District Personnel File and immediate supervisor for reference 
purposes. 
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT 
Citizen's Complaint Form 
To be completed by District Employee Receiving Complaint 




Location of Occurrence: 
(Home); ( L JWork) 
Date & Time of Occurrence: 
Alleged Misconduct of Employee (brief narrative):^ 
Person Receiving Complaint: Date: Time: Hrs. 
NOTE: CITIZEN WILL BE ADVISED OR RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 
Under Utah Law it is a misdemeanor offense to give false information to a peace officer. 
Signed:^ 
Receiving Supervisor Citizen 
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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
TITLE: MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
Effective date: 07-01-99 Revised: 
Approved By: PSD Board Dist. To: All Personnel 
Section 1: POLICY 
It is policy of this District to maintain specific rights, by management for the 
purpose of efficient operation of the District. 
Section 2: EXPRESS RIGHTS 
A. The District possesses the sole right to operate the District and all 
management rights remain with the District. These rights include, but are 
not limited to, the following: 
L The right to hire, direct, assign, promote, transfer, classify, suspend, 
demote, discharge, or discipline employees; 
2. The right to maintain the efficiency of its operations; 
3. The right to relieve any employee from duty, to reduce in force or 
lay off any employee because of lack of work or lack of funds. Or 
for any other legitimate reason; 
4. The right to determine appropriate staffing levels and work 
performance standards; 
5. The right to determine the content of the work day including the 
work load, the number of days which will constitute the work 
week, the number of hours which will constitute the work day, and 
the specific day to be designated as payday; 
6. The right to determine the quality and quantity of services offered 
to the public, and the manner and means of offering those services; 
7. The right to issue, amend or revise policies, rules, regulations and 
practices it deems necessary to cany out all managerial and 
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administrative prerogatives and; 
8. The right to establish, change, combine, or eliminate jobs, positions, 
job classifications and descriptions. 
Section 3: OTHER RIGHTS 
The above are inclusive management rights, but other rights may also be possessed 
by the District. 
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
TITLE: PERSONAL CONDUCT 
Effective date: 07-01-99 Revised: 
Approved By: PSD Board Dist To: All Personnel 
Section 1: POLICY 
It is the policy of this District that all employee's personal conduct is such that no 
discredit nor lack of public trust is placed upon the District-
Section 2: GENERAL 
The conduct of Public Safety District employees in dealing with the general public 
is expected and required to be commensurate with the high level of public trust 
placed upon the Public Safety profession. Any public action, inaction, attitude or 
opinion of personnel which can be interpreted as unprofessional or unworthy of the 
public trust in Public Safety Officials tends to undermine and detract from the 
public respect of Public Safety Members individually and collectively. 
Without this public respect, our jobs become extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
This respect, however, cannot be legislated by any authority. Public respect must 
be earned by exemplary conduct in the performance of duties. 
Each member shall so regulate his or her conduct so that no action on his or her 
part could result in unfavorable criticism of any such sworn or civilian employee of 
the District. 
Section 3: CONDUCT 
The following acts or omissions shall be prohibited by members of the District. A 
member may be disciplined or dismissed from the District for any act herein 
enumerated if the act seriously impairs department operations or seriously 
undermines the public confidence in the Department or District. 
A. Members shall not willfully violate any Federal, State, local law or 
ordinance. 
B. Members shall not engage in games of chance in violation of any law 
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except in performance of duty, with appropriate consent. 
C. Members shall not possess or use marijuana or any other form or illegal 
contraband, including unauthorized narcotics. 
B. Members shall be respectful, courteous and civil with the public and each 
other and shall not use coarse, loud, indecent, profane or unnecessarily 
harsh language, or in any way conduct themselves in a disorderiy manner. 
C. Members shall not become a part of any organization, association, 
movement, group, or combination which has adopted a policy of 
advocating violence or acts offeree to deny others their constitutional 
rights; or who seek to alter the form of government by unconstitutional 
means; or who advocate racial or religious discrimination as a political 
philosophy or objective. 
D. Members shall not misuse the Public Safety radio. Misuse will include: 
inappropriate language, unprofessional phrases or slang, use of the Public 
Safety District radio system for personal reasons or personal gain. 
E. No member shall be derelict in their duty. The following acts or omissions 
shall constitute dereliction of duty: 
1. Failure to obey orders, willful or repeated violation of any rule, 
regulation, or policy of the department. 
2. Failure to make a proper report of incidence investigated, observed, 
or reported. 
3. Failure of a member to give his or her name to any citizen upon 
request or failure to display District identification if in civilian 
clothes and off-duty. Under exceptional circumstances, such as 
authorized undercover work, or for the members personal security, 
this regulation may be suspended. 
4. For any member to be absent on unauthorized leave. 
5. For cowardice or failure to support fellow members or Mure to 
perform official duties because of fear. 
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6- For sleeping while on duty (except in authorized circumstances). 
7. For failure to complete required training requirements, 
8. For neglect of duty. 
9. For displaying reluctance to properly perform assigned duties, or 
acting in a manner tending to bring discredit upon himself herself 
or the District. Failing to assume responsibility or exercise 
diligence and interest in pursuit of duties, or displaying a lack of 
energy of such character as to amount to incompetency. 
10. For criticism of superior or fellow officers. 
11. For political activities while on duty or in a duty role. 
12. Conduct unbecoming to a Public Safety employee, 
13. Failure of a Supervisor or Commander to immediately take action 
when the violation comes to his/her attention. 
F. Members shall avoid unnecessary conversations or controversy and give his 
or her name in a respectful manner to any person who may request the 
same when acting in any official capacity. 
G. Members shall avoid answering questions in a short or abrupt manner and 
shall give the greatest possible attention and courtesy. 
H. Members shall not loiter in cafes, drive-ins, or other public places except 
for the purpose of conducting District business or tajdng regular meals or 
refreshments. 
L Members shall not use their position with the District to gain any personal 
advantage concerning the obtaining of goods, products or services. 
J. Members shall not appropriate lost, found, stolen evidence or District 
property to his/her own use, 
K. Members shall not feign sickness or injury to escape duty. 
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L. Members shall handle all District property with care in an effort to prevent 
damage due to carelessness. 
M. When off duty, police officers may carry or have in their immediate 
possession their badge, weapon and issues identification. 
Section 4: DRESS - COURT/TRAINING CLASSES 
A. Members appearing in any Court or public hearing shall be dressed either in 
full uniform, (including a sidearm for police officers); or conservative 
clothing which shall include a necktie and jacket. Members shall not 
appear in court in part of the official uniform or in what is termed "sports 
attire," 
Police Officers wearing civilian clothing may carry an off-duty weapon if 
they so desire so long as the weapon is covered and the Police Officer is 
carrying appropriate Police I.D. 
B. All members shall dress appropriately when attending training classes. 
Unless otherwise directed by the type of training received, (Le. firearms, 
defensive tactics, etc.), all members will wear neat, clean conservative 
clothing. Each member will present himselfTherself with a professional 
appearance as he/she represents himseliTherself at training classes and 
represent the District. 
The only exception to this policy will be in the event of emergency call-out 
where no previous notice was given. 
Section 5: PUBLIC APPEARANCES 
On occasion, Public Safety personnel are requested or invited to make public 
appearances on radio, television, or publicly in an official capacity. Such 
invitations will not be accepted unless the Department Chief has reviewed and 
approved such an appearance. Any member may make appropriate 
recommendations concerning official public appearances and suggest the member 
most appropriate for the occasion. Members should strongly consider referring 
requests for public appearance to the respective Department Chief. Any unplanned 
public appearance does not necessitate prior approval by the Department Chief 
Section 6: USE OF ALCOHOL 
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A. No member shall drink or purchase intoxicants while wearing his/her 
uniform. 
B. No member shall drink intoxicants while on duty unless authorized in the 
performance of duty (i.e. undercover). 
C No member shall report for a regular tour of duty or be on a regular tour of 
duty while under the influence of alcohol, or be unfit for duty because of 
such use. The odor of an alcoholic beverage on the breath will be 
considered suspicion for impairment entitled see section of rules and 
regulation on Alcohol/Drug free work place. 
K. No member shall consume, nor keep intoxicating liquor at any Public 
Safety building, locker room, a District vehicle, or upon any property 
allotted for the use of the District. This does not apply to legally seized 
evidence being transported pursuant to an active case. Nor does this 
section apply to the police evidence vault. 
L. Members shall not appear in public places while intoxicated, whether on or 
off-duty. 
M. Members shall not excessively use intoxicants. 
Section 7: USE OF NARCOTICS 
A No member shall use or purchase narcotics while wearing his/her uniform. 
B- Member shall not use or possess narcotics, nor dangerous or habit forming 
drugs, unless such drugs or narcotics are property prescribed by a physician 
or dentist for an illness, injury, or other such legitimate treatment 
C Allowances for possession and simulated of drugs by undercover agents 
shall be made. 
D. No member shall consume, nor keep narcotics at any public safety building, 
any locker room, a District vehicle, or upon any property allotted for the 
use of the District This does not apply to legally seized evidence being 
transported pursuant to an active case. Nor does this section apply to 
evidence. 
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Section 7: INCOMPETENCE 
Members shall conduct their duties in a competent and efficient manner and are 
expected to exercise good judgement in the performance of their assignments. 
A. LOW PERFORMANCE 
Members shall not engage in any activity that lowers their ability to 
perform their assignment and obligations. 
Section 8: PATRIOTIC COURTESY 
B. 
On all public occasions, all of the members of the Police Department who 
are in uniform shall salute the National Colors and the playing of the 
National Anthem with the hand solute in a military manner. The only 
exception shall be whenever officers are performing police duty requiring 
immediate action or in formation when salute is made by Commander or 
Officer in charge. 
All civilian employees and all members of the District who are not in 
uniform shall render the National Colors and the National Anthem the 
honors and courtesies customarily accorded to them. Such members shall 
stand at attention, and the men shall remove their hats while the National 
Colors are passing by and while the National Anthem is being played. 
Section 9: RELIGIOUS AND PERSONAL VIEWS 
Members shall not, while on duty or in uniform, engage in religious debates or 
discussions to the detriment of good discipline, nor speak despairingly of the 
nationality, race or beliefs of any person. 
Section 10: GRATUITIES 
A. PURPOSE 
The intent of this is to set forth the policy of the District relative to the 
acceptance of gratuities or gifts by members of this District. 
B. POLICY 
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1. It shall be the policy of this District to follow guidelines set forth in 
the Utah State Code which deals with accepting gifts or loans. 
(Utah Code 67-16-5) 
2. All members of this District, including sworn, non-sworn, 
temporary, and part-time, shall not solicit or encourage gratuities or 
gifts to be offered, while either on-duty or off-duty. 
C. GRATUITIES OR GIFTS DELIVERED 
Any gratuity or gift with a value of $50 or more delivered to any member 
of this District for his/her own use or dissemination among other members 
shall be immediately reported to the Recipients Department Chie£ who 
intern will relay this information to the Director of Public Safety. 
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76-5-107. Terroristic threat - Penalty. 
(1) A person commits a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any offense 
involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage, and: 
(a) he threatens the use of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Section 
76-10-401, or threatens by the use of a hoax weapon of mass destruction, as 
defined in Section 76-10-401; or 
(b) he acts with intent to: 
(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect the 
conduct of a government or a unit of government; 
(ii) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to 
deal with emergencies; 
(iii) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily 
injury, or death; or 
(iv) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or a portion of the 
building, a place to which the public has access, or a facility or vehicle of public 
transportation operated by a common carrier. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b)(i) is a second degree felony. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b)(iv) is a third degree felony. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person did not attempt to or was 
incapable of carrying out the threat. 
(4) A threat under this section may be express or implied. 
(5) A person who commits an offense under this section is subject to 
punishment for that offense, in addition to any other offense committed, including 
the carrying out of the threatened act. 
(6) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any 
person convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or 
local unit of government, or any private business, organization, individual, or 
entity for all expenses and losses incurred in responding to the violation, unless the 
court states on the record the reasons why the reimbursement would be 
inappropriate. 
APPENDIX 6 
76-8-313. Threatening elected officials — Assault 
A person commits assault on an elected official when he attempts or threatens, 
irrespective of a showing of immediate force or violence, to inflict bodily injury to 
the elected official with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the 
elected official in the performance of his official duties or with the intent to 
retaliate against the elected official because of the performance of his official 
duties. 
76-8-314, Threatening elected officials — "Elected official" defined. 
As used in this section, "elected official" means: 
(1) any elected official of the state, county, or city and includes the members of 
the official's immediate family; 
(2) any temporary judge appointed to fill a vacant judicial position; 
(3) any judge not yet retained by a retention election; 
(4) any member of a school board; and 
(5) any person appointed to fill a vacant position of an elected official as 
defined in Subsection (1). 
